

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2946

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 HELSINKI 2295

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PCAT, PARM, UR, US  
SUBJECT: US-SOVIET CAT: JULY 18 MEETING OF SENIOR MILITARY  
REPRESENTATIVES

1. FIRST SEPARATE MEETING BETWEEN SENIOR MILITARY REPRESENTA-  
TIVE OF US-SOVIET CAT DELEGATIONS TOOK PLACE ON JULY 18 FROM  
1600-1740. US SIDE HEADED BY RADM JAMES A. LYONS PLUS  
JOHN MERRPLL, COL RONALD NELSON, AND GARY MATTHEWS. SOVIET  
SIDE HEADED BY GENERAL-LIEUTENANT PAVEL IVANOVICH GALKIN,  
PLUS REAR ADMIRAL VALENTIN ANDREYEVICH VLASOV, AND  
COLONEL VASSILY IVANOVICH IVANOV.

2. RADM LYONS BEGAN SESSION BY NOTING THAT ESTIMATE AND  
ASSESSMENT OF MILITARY BALANCE WITHIN THE REGIONS WOULD BE  
AN APPROPRIATE SUBJECT FOR SENIOR MILITARY REPS TO CONSIDER.  
IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT WE COME TO A MODUS VIVENDI ON ESTAB-  
LISHING THE MILITARY BALANCE FOR REGIONS OR SUB-REGIONS SINCE  
WITHOUT THAT THERE WAS NO BASIS FOR A COMMON POINT OF DEPAR-  
TURE. AS MILITARY PEOPLE, WE COULD MAKE A MILITARY ASSESSMENT  
OF A RELATIVE MILITARY BALANCE IN A CERTAIN FRAMEWORK, AND HAD  
THE POSSIBILITY OF COMPARING THE CAPABILITIES OF COUNTRY  
X WITH THOSE OF COUNTRY Y. OTHER ELEMENTS INCLUDED  
ASSESSMENT OF THE POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT IN A GIVEN

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REGION OR SUB-REGION, THE ABILITY OF RECIPIENT COUNTRIES  
TO ABSORB ARMS TRANSFERS, THEIR NEED FOR TECHNICALLY  
TRAINED PERSONNEL AND IN WHAT NUMBERS, THE ECONOMIC  
VIABILITY OF RECIPIENTS, AND WHETHER A TRANSFER ITSELF  
WOULD UPSET THE REGIONAL OR SUB-REGIONAL BALANCE.

3. RADM LYONS SAID THAT AN EXAMPLE OF WHAT HE WAS

TALING ABOUT WAS THE ANDEAN REGION. LOOKING AT THE ANDEAN REGION PRIOR TO 1975, OUR ASSESSMENT WAS THAT THERE WAS A ROUGH MILITARY BALANCE THERE. SUBSEQUENT TO 1975, WHEN THE USSR CONCLUDED ITS ARMS TRANSFER AGREEMENT WITH PERU, THE ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT AND SCALE SHOWED A HIGHER DEGREE OF SOPHISTICATION OF ARMS WHICH INTRODUCED A NEW ELEMENT INTO THE ANDEAN SITUATION. FOR EXAMPLE, THE US BELIEVED THAT THE SU-20 AIRCRAFT WAS HIGHER IN SOPHISTICATION THAN THAT WHICH HAD EXISTED BEFORE SINCE, WITHOUT THE SU-20, THERE HAD BEEN A ROUGH AIR EQUIVALENT IN NUMBERS AND LEVEL OF TECHNOLOGY BETWEEN PERU AND HER NEIGHBORS. NOW PERU HAD GREATER CAPABILITIES THAN ALL HER NEIGHBORS COMBINED. PERU HAD ALSO RECEIVED A LARGE QUANTITY OF TANKS IN EXCESS OF NEEDS AND PERU'S MOBILITY OF GROUND FORCES HAD BEEN ENHANCED BY THE RECEIPT OF TRANSPORTS AND HELICOPTERS. ALL OF THIS WAS ILLUSTRATIVE AS TO HOW WE ASSESS A BALANCE IN A REGION. AN IMBALANCE NOW EXISTED IN THE ANDEAN REGION AND THIS FANNED THE FLAMES OF AN ARMS RACE THERE BECAUSE OTHER COUNTRIES DID NOT WANT TO REMAIN IN AN IMBALANCED SITUATION.

4. GENERAL GALKIN RESPONDED BY ASKING, THAT AS FOR MILITARY BALANCE AND IMBALANCE, ESPECIALLY IN THE ANDEAN REGION, IN GENERAL WHO WAS TO DETERMINE BALANCE OF IMBALANCE IN A REGION OR SUB-REGION? THE US OR USSR AND  
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OTHER COUNTRIES CONCERNED COULD DO THIS, BUT HE THOUGHT THIS WAS MORE COMPLEX. HE COULD NOT AGREE THAT WE COULD ONLY LOOK AT SUCH QUESTIONS FROM THE MILITARY POINT OF VIEW SINCE ALL MILITARY QUESTIONS WERE CONNECTED WITH POLITICS. THEREFORE, GALKIN SAID, MILITARY PEOPLE SHOULD ALSO LINK ANY MILITARY QUESTIONS TO POLITICAL/LLEGAL ISSUES. THE QUESTION OF MILITARY BALANCE OR IMBALANCE ALWAYS RESTED ON POLITICAL ISSUES SINCE LOOKING AT A BALANCE WAS A QUESTION OF VARIOUS SIDES, INPUTS, OUTPUTS, ETC. AND IF WE HAD OPPOSING SIDES, THEN THERE WAS A POLITICAL QUESTION OF WHY THEY CONFRONT ONE ANOTHER. WHEN ONE LOOKED AT POLITICAL/LLEGAL ISSUES, AND ANOTHER WORKING GROUP WAS DOING THIS, YOU COULD ALWAYS DETERMINE RIGHT AND WRONG AND WHO SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT GET AID. IF WE WERE GUIDED BY SUCH POLITICAL/LLEGAL PRINCIPLES, THE QUESTION OF BALANCE NEED NOT ARISE. GALKIN SAID THAT LYONS, ON THE OTHER HAND, WAS PUTTING THE QUESTION OF BALANCE IN FRONT OF POLITICAL ISSUES, FINDING THE MILITARY BALANCE MORE IMPORTANT THAN POLITICAL ISSUES IN A GIVEN REGION. IF A BIG COUNTRY ATTACKED A SMALL COUNTRY AND WE GAVE AID TO REPEL THE AGGRESSION, THE WEAKER COUNTRY WOULD

BECOME STRONGER, BUT THE US PRINCIPLE SEEMED TO BE THAT IF THE AGGRESSOR BECAME WEAKER IT SHOULD RECEIVE AID AS WELL. CITING ISRAEL AS AN EXAMPLE, GALKIN SAID HE FOUND IT IMPOSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN THIS VIEW OF BALANCE BETWEEN AGGRESSOR AND VICTIMS. TALKING ABOUT MILITARY BALANCE AND IMBALANCE WAS REMOVED FROM THE REAL SITUATION AND CREATED THE IMPRESSION THAT THE LIFE OF CERTAIN COUNTRIES WOULD BE DETERMINED BY THE US OR USSR. AS TO WHETHER ARMS TRANSFERS REQUIRE NUMBERS OF ADVISORS AND HOW THEY AFFECT THE ECONOMIC SITUATION OF THE COUNTRY, THOSE WERE QUESTIONS THAT THE COUNTRY REQUESTING AID WOULD DECIDE ITSELF. SOME COUNTRIES OPPOSING ISRAEL SPOKE OF SWEAT AND BLOOD TO GET THEIR LANDS BACK AND COUNTRIES FIGHTING FOR INDEPENDENCE DID  
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NOT LOOK AT COSTS. APPLYING POLITICAL/LEGAL PRINCIPLES HERE, ONE HAD TO COME TO THE AID OF VICTIMS OF AGRES-  
SION.

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5. AS FOR PERU AND SOVIET TRANSFERS OF AIRCRAFT AND TANKS, GALKIN SAID THAT PERUVIAN LEADERS HAD STATED THEIR DEFENSE NEEDS AND BOUGHT WHERE IT WAS BEST AND CHEAPER. HE WAS SURE THAT PERU HAD ALSO TURNED TO THE US FOR ARMS. AS REGARDS PRINCIPLE, IT WAS THE SAME. CHILE AND BOLIVIA HAD

CLAIMS ON SOUTHERN PERU AND ITS ACCESS TO THE SEA AND PERU DID NOT WANT TO REMAIN UNARMED. GALKIN CONCLUDED HIS RESPONSE BY REFERRING TO GELB'S STATEMENT IN PLENARY SESSION THAT THE US INTENDED TO DELIVER ARMS TO AFRICA. GALKIN SAID IT WAS NOT CLEAR TO THE SOVIET SIDE WHO WOULD RECEIVE THESE ARMS OR WHETHER THEY WOULD GO TO COUNTRIES WHICH THREATENED THEIR NEIGHBORS.

6. RADM LYONS SAID HE WISHED TO SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT ON WHAT HE HAD SAID ABOUT THE MILITARY BALANCE. HE HAD NEVER SAID THE MILITARY BALANCE WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAN POLITICAL/LEGAL OR MILITARY/TECHNICAL ASPECTS, BUT WE WANTED TO GET A BLEND OF THOSE AND IN ORDER TO APPLY CRITERIA ONE MUST ESTABLISH A BASELINE TO DETERMINE IF ARMS TRANSFERS WERE NECESSARY AND, IF SO, IN WHAT QUANTITY AND QUALITY. AS FOR PERU, THE US HAD TURNED DOWN THEIR ARMS REQUESTS BECAUSE WE APPLIED THE CONCEPT OF MILITARY BALANCE AND DETERMINED THAT (1) THEY WERE EXCESSIVE, (2) THE THREAT DID NOT WARRANT IT, AND  
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(3) PERU WAS BANKRUPT. IN THAT REGARD, LYONS ASKED GALKIN HOW THE USSR HAD REACHED ITS DECISION TO SUPPLY ARMS. DID IT CONSIDER ALL THE FACTORS, E.G., CREATING AN IMBALANCE? AS FOR ISRAEL, HE HAD TO SAY THAT WAS A LONG WAY FROM THE ANDEAN REGION WHERE WE STARTED IN THE DISCUSSION. NEVERTHELESS, WE HAD GUARANTEED THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL. IF HE WERE TO APPLY STRICTLY THE POLITICAL LEGAL CRITERIA, THIS WOULD LEAVE ISRAEL STRIPPED AND DEFENSELESS. WE COULD NOT AGREE TO THIS AND GALKIN SHOULD UNDERSTAND THIS. THE HORN OF AFRICA WAS ANOTHER GOOD ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE OF THE MILITARY BALANCE IN A REGION. WHEN LYONS REVIEWED ARMS TRANSFERS TO SOMALIA BETWEEN 1972-76, AND IF HE APPLIED THE SOVIET POLITICAL/LEGAL CRITERIA, HE FOUND THEM DIFFICULT TO JUSTIFY ON THE COUNTS OF THREAT AND OF SOMALIA'S TERRITORIAL AGGRANDIZEMENT AGAINST HER NEIGHBORS. IN THE US VIEW, HAD THE SOVIETS APPLIED THE MILITARY BALANCE CONCEPT TO THE REGION, THEY WOULD HAVE FOUND THAT THE THREAT DID NOT JUSTIFY TRANSFERS. THEY PERMITTED SOMALIA TO SETTLE HER TERRITORIAL CLAIMS BY FORCE RATHER THAN BY NEGOTIATIONS. AS FOR GELB'S STATEMENT ON TRANSFERS TO AFRICA, HE HAD SPECIFICALLY STATED THAT DECISIONS WILL DEPEND IN LARGE PART ON SOVIET RESTRAINT AND WHETHER THE USSR LIMITED THIS TO SPARE PARTS AND OTHER LIMITED SUPPLIES.

7. GALKIN RESPONDED BY AGAIN STATING THE SOVIET VIEW THAT WE HAD AGREED TO WORK OUT A LIST OF POLITICAL/LEGAL CRITERIA AS GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING ARMS TRANS-

FERS. THE USSR HAD FOUND AND STILL FINDS THAT POLITICAL/  
LEGAL PRINCIPLES DETERMINE ITS ARMS TRANSFERS. AS WE  
WORKED OUT POLITICAL/LEGAL PRINCIPLES, THEN THE MILITARY/  
TECHNICAL AND BALANCE ASPECTS WOULD FIND THEIR SOLUTIONS.

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AS A MILITARY MAN, GALKIN SAID THAT IF WE AGREED ON  
POLITICAL/LEGAL PRINCIPLES, WE WOULD THEN KNOW WHICH  
COUNTRY IS RIGHT OR WRONG. AS FOR ETHIOPIA AND SOMALIA,  
WE WERE LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE IN DEVELOPING PRIN-  
CIPLES.

8. GALKIN SAID HE WANTED TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF HOW  
THE US SIDE COULD TALK ABOUT RESTRAINT EVEN AS IT HAD  
OUT \$36 BILLION IN ARMS CONTRACT OBLIGATIONS WHICH WOULD  
BE MET. FOR EXAMPLE, LOOK AT THE HUGE DELIVERIES TO  
IRAN, A SOVIET NEIGHBOR. THE SOVIETS WOULD KNOW WHERE  
IN A BALANCE TO DELIVER THEIR ARMS. IN THE US LOGIC,  
THE USSR COULD DELIVER TO ANOTHER BORDERING COUNTRY TO  
BALANCE; THIS WAS "BY THE WAY." THE USSR WAS NOT  
AGAINST OUR UNDERTAKING, BUT THE TASK WAS TO MOVE FOR-  
WARD AND DEVELOP POLITICAL/LEGAL CRITERIA TO GUIDE  
US. WE COULD NOT TALK ABOUT THE BALANCE IN A CERTAIN  
COUNTRY OR REGION WITHOUT SUCH PRINCIPLES.

9. RADM LYONS RESPONDED BY NOTING, AS GELB HAD SAID,  
THAT WE MUST PROCEED NOT ONLY ON POLITICAL/LEGAL BUT  
IN PARALLEL WITH MILITARY/TECHNICAL CRITERIA. AS  
SUPPLIERS, WE HAD A CERTAIN RESPONSIBILITY FOR WHAT AND  
HOW WE TRANSFER ARMS IN ORDER TO AVOID THE SITUATIONS  
GALKIN HAD ALLUDED TO IN THE PAST. AS TO DETERMINING  
THE BALANCE, WE HAD IN AYACUCHO AN EXAMPLE WHERE RECIP-  
IENT COUNTRIES THEMSELVES HAD THE INTENTION TO RESTRAIN  
THEMSELVES. THAT WAS AN IDEAL SITUATION AND, IF THE  
USSR COULD ENDORSE THE PRINCIPLES OF AYACUCHO IN THE  
WORKING GROUP MECHANISM OR ELSEWHERE, WE COULD DEAL  
WITH TRANSFERS TO THOSE COUNTRIES. LYONS ASKED, WITH  
REGARD TO GALKIN'S COMMENT ON THE PRINCIPLES FOR THE  
FUTURE, IF HE COULD CONCLUDE THAT THESE WERE NOT APPLIED  
TO THE PAST SITUATIONS IN PERU, SOMALIA, AND ETHIOPIA.  
GALKIN REPLIED "NO" AND SAID THAT EVEN THOUGH SUCH  
PRINCIPLES DID NOT EXIST, THE USSR WAS GUIDED BY THE

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UN CHARTER AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES.  
LYONS THEN NOTED THAT, AS REGARDS GALKIN'S CLAIM OF

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EXDIS

\$36 BILLION IN US ARMS TRANSFER OBLIGATIONS, HE HAD NOT HEARD THIS FIGURE USED BEFORE. NATURALLY, WE HAD CONTRACTS FOR SEVERAL YEARS PREVIOUSLY AND IT WAS NOT JUST A QUESTION OF LAST YEAR'S CONTRACTS. GALKIN REPLIED THAT HE REALIZED IT WAS NOT SUDDEN, BUT HAD ACCUMULATED OVER A NUMBER OF YEARS. NEVERTHELESS, IT HAD ACCUMULATED AND HOW COULD ONE NOT LOOK AT THE FIGURES AS THE PRESIDENT SPOKE OF UNILATERAL RESTRAINT.

8. RADM LYONS AGAIN EMPHASIZED THAT THE PRESIDENT LAST YEAR HAD CLEARLY STATED THE US POLICY OF RESTRAINT. WHETHER IT CONTINUED DEPENDED ON THE POLICY WHICH THE USSR TOOK. AS FOR IRAN, THOSE TRANSFERS WERE ONLY FOR SELF-DEFENSE AND HAD THIS CHARACTER. THERE WAS A THREAT FROM IRAQ AND IT WAS CLEAR WE WANT TO AVOID AN IMBALANCE. AS FOR CUBA, NO SIMILAR THREAT SITUATION EXISTED AND YET THE USSR TRANSFERS MUCH MORE THERE AND CUBA THEN RETRANSHIPS SOME OF THOSE ARMS. CONCLUDING THE SESSION, LYONS SAID HE WOULD LOOK TO MEET AGAIN LATER IN THE WEEK FOR A DISCUSSION OF VERIFICATION ISSUES AND TO HEAR GALKIN'S VIEWS ON HOW WE COULD IMPLEMENT DETERMINATIONS OF THE MILITARY BALANCE. GALKIN RESPONDED THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO REPORT TO AMBASSADOR MENDELEVICH BEFORE DISCUSSING VERIFICATION, BUT HE AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO DISCUSS IT. GALKIN REITERATED THAT THE

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QUESTION OF MILITARY BALANCE WOULD NOT ARISE IF WE  
ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLES. LYONS CONCLUDED BY NOTING  
THAT THIS WOULD BE UTOPIA, AND HE WOULD EXERCISE HIS  
PREROGATIVE AS HOST TO RAISE THE TOPIC AGAIN.  
RIDGWAY

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